Foreword by CPI
The upcoming Bersih 2.0 rally is being closely followed not only in the country but also all over the region. As the official case relating to the need for abandonment or cancellation of the march is aggressively pursued in the print media, it is even more important for the public to have access to the findings of independent scholars and researchers who have studied the country’s elections and electoral system in depth so that voters are familiar with the ways in which our democratic system has been debased and abused.
Below we’re carrying an academic paper ‘Malaysia’s electoral system: Government of the people?’ by Assoc. Prof. Tey Tsun Hang of the National University of Singapore that examines the procedures and processes of our electoral system from a legal perspective. The paper which is being reproduced in three parts here was recently published in the Asian Journal of Comparative Law
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M’sia’s electoral system: Govt of the people?
By Tey Tsun Hang
I. Introduction
More a result of political developments brought about by its ruling elite, rather than a residue of history and inertia, Malaysia’s election laws have many of the forms and features of electoral democracy1 with the authoritarian structures and powers of a strong state.
Whilst the actual conduct of elections and the wider social conditions surrounding the conduct of elections – such as the situation of civil liberties, curbs and impediments imposed on the opposition2 and the degree of free and fair access to the mass media3 – are of critical importance to the existence of a democratic electoral process, this article is limited to Malaysia’s election laws.
This article seeks to examine the constitutional and legal aspects of Malaysia’s election laws (within its first-past-the-post electoral system) seen within the broader socio-political context of Malaysia’s plural society and ethnic-based political representation to evaluate if they conform to democratic principles and equitable standards. In particular, this article seeks to:
(i) explore how the growth of the dominant political elite has had direct implications for the development of Malaysia’s electoral regime and arrangements for the holding of democratic elections;
(ii) survey the implementation and enforcement of the election laws, including the Elections Act, Election Offences Act, Election Commission Act, Election Petition Rules and Elections (Conduct of Elections) Regulations;
(iii) examine the need of immunity for the Election Commission;
(iv) examine the role of the judiciary; and
(v) highlight the areas for urgent electoral reforms to restore public confidence in the electoral system and ensure the legitimacy of the political system.
II. M’sia’s political set-up and the inherited election laws
Malaysia, a federation comprising 13 states,4 although politically dominated by the ethnic Malays, is heterogeneous with substantial Indian, indigenous and Chinese minorities. Its population today is estimated at some 28 million.5 Formerly known as the Federation of Malaya after its independence in 1957 from British colonial rule, it was later renamed the Federation of Malaysia in 1963 following the merger with Singapore and the Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak.6
The form of government in Malaysia is constitutional, monarchical and parliamentary at both the state and federal levels with every state having its own constitution.7 Common to every state is a Federal Constitution which guarantees and provides for a separation of important powers at the federal level. While the federal government is bicameral 8 in nature, the individual states in the federation consist of unicameral State Legislative Assemblies (Dewan Undangan Negeri)
Malaysia’s political mobilisation as a whole follows clear ethnic divisions, and its politics is communally-orientated.9 The three major component parties of its ruling coalition10 – which has remained in uninterrupted power since 1957 11 – restrict their membership to those of one ethnic group respectively. The struggle for power is still generally among political parties representing, or are dominated by, particular ethnic groups. Ethnic-based political representation appears to be the predominant consideration any Malaysian political party must entertain to compete with their rivals on the political playing field.
More specifically, political contestation in Malaysia today engenders a clash between an assortment of opposition (but sometimes allied 12) members on the one hand, and the dominant, ethnically well-spread Barisan Nasional (BN) comprising the United Malays National Organisation (Umno), Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA) and Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC) on the other side. It will be demonstrated in the course of this article how electoral democracy in Malaysia has for decades been persistently ethnicised by political forces, and how the ruling coalition has increasingly adopted a measured calculus to defeat its political rivals in the elections depending on their ethnic-polarity.
Demographically, the Malays make up approximately 62 per cent of the federal population, with the Chinese forming the second major race at around 24 per cent, and the Indians, 8 per cent. 13 An estimated 7 per cent of the population is made up of non-Malay indigenous bumiputras of Sabah and Sarawak. 14 It will be seen in due course that even such native groups of the Borneo states play a significant role in shaping and developing a pervasively ethnicised, communalised or plural nature of the Malaysian society, 15 pushing electoral politics in a direction that entails ethnically-polarised political representation and participation in Malaysia.16
Since 1954, Malaysia has adopted election laws generally practised then in the United Kingdom.17 The main election laws are found in the Elections Act 1958, Elections Offences Act 1954, 18 Election Commission Act 1957, Elections (Registration of Electors) Regulations 2002, and Elections (Conduct of Elections) Regulations 1981. The electoral system essentially subscribes to a first-past-the post or plurality method which favours big parties at the expense of the smaller ones, and promises a stronger government than does proportional representation.19
Throughout Malaysia’s political history, parliamentary elections have been held every four years or so, the latest on 8 March 2008. The BN (or its predecessor, the Alliance) has emerged as the main victor in every election despite its low vote percentage. For instance, the BN won 90.4 per cent of the parliamentary seats with a significantly low vote percentage of 63.9 per cent.20 A more egregious example would be the 1969 election results where the BN secured a 64 per cent of the parliamentary seats in spite of winning an all-time low of 49.3 per cent of votes cast.
It would be seen that this was, and is going to continue to be, made possible through a weightage principle that favours the rural (and mainly Malay) votes, thereby giving rise to an odd statistical comparison in the parliamentary elections.21
The Election Commission was constitutionally established in 1957 under Article 114 of the Federal Constitution.22 The intended objective was to allow for transparent administration and conduct of the electoral process that must be seen as fair to all competing political parties.23 However, this does not mean that the credibility of the electoral system is entirely dependent on the performance of the Election Commission, for the electoral process could be controlled and manipulated by the legislature and certain government practices.
It is important to appreciate that the overwhelming control by the BN has had direct implications on the way Malaysia’s electoral system is modified and adapted over the decades in order to preserve the status quo of retaining BN’s political leadership in Malaysia. This, as will be seen later, came in the form of constitutional amendments.
Legislative interference, however, is not the only factor behind the BN’s control of the electoral process. The BN has at its disposal a whole array of state resources, including the command of administrative apparatuses, the control over economic resources, and the ownership and regulation of the mass media.24
This article analyses how the BN, ultimately, enlists a multi-pronged approach to stack the decks in its favour: legislative sculpting, behavioural conditioning of the Election Commission and exploitative use of the state machinery to aid in its campaigning efforts.
Finally, it would be seen that Malaysia has departed sharply from the orthodoxy of electoral democracy following the abolition of local government elections in the 1960s.25 This was to curb the growing influence of the Socialist Front which was at that time fast gaining popularity amongst the electorate.26 What was previously known as a democratic local government was therefore substituted with a nominated local government.27 Not only did this raise concerns over the accountability and transparency of the nominated local councillors, it also became unacceptable28 as the people no longer have a say in choosing their grassroot representatives in the government.
III. The Election Commission – Manipulated, constrained and inept
Electoral administration in Malaysia is carried out by the Election Commission.
The three main functions of the Election Commission are the delimitation of constituencies, the preparation and revision of electoral rolls and the conduct of elections for the House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat) and the Legislative
Assemblies of the states.29
The Election Commission comprised three members30 when it was first set up in 1957 under Article 114 of the Federal Constitution.31 Membership grew to four in 1963 following the formation of Malaysia and the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak. It was only in 1981 that the office of Deputy Chairman was created via a constitutional amendment, increasing its membership to five.32 The Election Commission may also appoint officers to assist in the administration and running of elections.33
Today, the Election Commission comprises a total of seven members 34 and is assisted by an office of the Secretariat. 35 Office-bearers in the Election Commission enjoy security of tenure36 similar to that of the judiciary, 37 as well as some measure of remunerative security. 38 This seeks to ensure that the Election Commission can discharge its functions independently without any undue political influence. 39 This objective, however, has not been achieved.
A. Inducing a compliant Election Commission
The independence of the Election Commission is not constitutionally guaranteed.
All that is provided by the Constitution is that the appointment of members “shall have regard to the importance of securing an Election Commission which enjoys public confidence”.40 The wider expression of “public confidence” does not necessarily equate with independence. It thus appears that Article 114(2) is a practically defective and unsatisfactory constitutional safeguard against potential partiality of the Election Commission in the discharge of its functions.
A good example is the ostensible pattern of appointing political party members41 and retired civil servants to office positions within the Election Commission.42 While such appointments do not ipso facto lead to a loss of “public confidence” in the Election Commission, the guarantee of an independent Election Commission is severely weakened. The fear of partiality and party bias could have been significantly allayed had Article 114(2) expressly provided for the independence of the Election Commission.
It is necessary to explain the position adopted by the governing political leadership. The ruling Alliance became aware that an independent Election Commission could harm its political control and dominance of the government, and thus saw the need to counterbalance any potential disadvantage such an Election Commission could bring to the Alliance, by making partisan appointments to the Election Commission.43
The first chairman of the Election Commission, Dr Mustafa Albakri went through a strained relationship with the government in the 1960s due to his independent stance in attempting to re-delineate the electoral constituencies after the 1959 election.
Article 114(4) was amended in 1960 44 to provide for the removal of the chairman if he “engages in any paid office or employment outside the duties of his office”. Fortunately for Dr Mustafa Albakri, he was able to defend his office by relying on Article 114(6) which ensures that no terms of office of a member of the Election Commission shall be altered to his disadvantage after his appointment.45 This notwithstanding, the changes brought about by the amendment to Article 114(4) were widely perceived as an attempt aimed at removing him from the Election Commission.
However, the effect of this provision was later circumvented by the government via a constitutional amendment in 1962 which, inter alia, empowered Parliament to “provide for the terms of office of members of the Election Commission other than their remuneration”.46 This gave the government the power to intervene on the terms of office for appointment holders even before they officially hold office in the Election Commission, thereby preventing the government from falling foul of Article 114(6) in achieving its political agenda. This brought about the possibility that subsequently appointed members might become beholden to the very governmental organ the Election Commission was originally designed to enjoy independence from. This indirect ‘conditioning’ of subsequent appointment holders in the Election Commission was accompanied by the engineered co-optation of the Election Commission through partisan47 appointments within its office, thereby granting the Alliance considerable assurance of its continued dominance within the government.
Recent developments in the Malaysian electoral system also indicate clearly manipulative behaviour of the ruling coalition. In late 2007, Parliament moved to pass a bill the effect of which is the extension of the retirement age of the Election Commission chairman from 65 to 66.48 The Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2007 was tabled for the first reading in Parliament less than two months before expiry of the term of office of the incumbent Election Commission chairman.49 In a matter of weeks, the bill was approved by Parliament, retaining the incumbent chairman in office for an additional year in spite of heavy resistance from both the public and opposition members in the legislature.50 This was made possible only because the ruling coalition commanded an overwhelming majority in the legislature, holding more than four-fifths of the seats in the Lower House.51
The ruling coalition found it imperative to retain and employ the service of an Election Commission chairman who was widely criticised for being deferential to the BN in the discharge of his duties. Or perhaps, at least, his presumed ineptitude in managing the administration of past elections has proved to have been serendipitously favourable to the continuous electoral success of the BN.
The ruling coalition would, however, rather to turn a deaf ear to public outcry in the pursuit of its own political agenda, no matter how blatantly indiscreet its measures in doing so appear to be.52
The perceived inefficiency of the Election Commission in administering elections – whether through impartiality or sheer ineptitude – could potentially lead to election outcomes which hardly reflect the true will of the people.
B. Delimiting the powers of the delimiter
Constitutional reforms over the decades have effectively reduced the Election Commission to a mere administrative body with virtually meaningless administrative powers. In order to appreciate the full effect of these constitutional reforms, it is important to revisit the initial position at the time the Federation of Malaya gained independence in 1957
The Alliance had by then acquired an overwhelming majority of 51 out of 52 seats in the first federal election in 1955. 53 Back then, the Alliance seemed content with the electoral system already in place as evidenced by its support of the recommendations made by the Reid Constitutional Commission. The Alliance was subsequently to bring about a gradual departure from those recommendations.
Until 1962, the Election Commission enjoyed full and final authority in the review and the delimitation of constituencies.54 The Election Commission did not have to seek the approval of the legislature in carrying out the delimitation of constituencies at state and federal levels. Once constituencies were delimited by the Election Commission, the ruling party in Parliament had no power to change it.
This prerogative of the Election Commission was removed with the passing of the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1962 55 which introduced a new Thirteenth Schedule to the Federal Constitution.56 Part II of the Thirteenth Schedule laid down the rules and procedure to be followed by the Election Commission in the delimitation of constituencies. What is notable is the sharp departure from the pre-amendment position – the Election Commission no longer had the final authority to review and delimit constituencies. It had to submit a report to the Prime Minister who would then present it to the House of Representatives for approval (with necessary amendments, if any, by the Prime Minister) by a simple majority vote.57
In 1973, the Constitution (Amendment) (No 2) Act 1973 58 amended Article 46 of the Constitution to allow the number of parliamentary constituencies and apportioned seats among the states to be established in accordance with what was specified in the new Article 46. This meant that the delimitation exercise by the Election Commission was severely restricted. 59 Although it has been observed elsewhere 60 that, notwithstanding the 1973 restrictions imposed on the Election Commission, the constituency reviews by the Election Commission could still extend to the total number of parliamentary constituencies, the combined effect of the 1973 amendments and the imposed mandatory parliamentary scrutiny of any recommended review by the Election Commission 61 has formalistically shrunk the scope of the Election Commission’s powers and its jurisdiction over constituencies. Today, the Election Commission’s jurisdiction to conduct the delimitation of constituencies and apportionment within every state continues to be subject to parliamentary approval.62
In 1984, the Constitution (Amendment) (No 2) Act 1984 63 removed the upper limit of the mandatory periodic review of constituencies, leaving only the lower limit of “an interval of not less than eight years [after the date of completion of the last review]”.64 The significance of this amendment is that there is no longer a requirement to compel a periodic review of constituencies if the Election Commission were not so minded. Periodic review, save for any eventualities specified in Article 113(3A),65 is no longer automatically triggered.
It should also be noted that the amended Article 113(3A) potentially enables review of constituencies to be triggered at the whim of the dominant ruling party by simply passing an amendment of Article 46. 66 This could effectively lead to the usurpation by the legislature of the Election Commission’s prerogative to initiate a review of constituencies at any time. The Election Commission therefore seems to have been relegated to being a mere executor administrator of the electoral system, always having to take its cue from the ruling government. As things stand today, the room for abuse is alarmingly wide.
C. Failure to measure up
No electoral administrator, however independent and politically-insulated, can bring about free and fair elections without exhibiting a high standard of competence and efficiency in the discharge of his or her responsibilities.
Malaysia’s Election Commission has been attracting persistent criticism regarding its revision of electoral rolls and the actual conduct of elections.67
(Assoc. Prof. Tey is director, Centre for Commercial Studies at the National University of Singapore.)
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Tomorrow: Notwithstanding the relatively constant percentage of the Malay population, the percentage of Malay-majority constituencies has seen a consistent increase over the years from the 1959 election to the 1999 election. (Part 2)
Footnote:
Tey, Tsun Hang (2010) "Malaysia's Electoral System: Government of the People?,"
Asian Journal of Comparative Law: Vol. 5: Iss. 1, Article 11.
DOI: 10.2202/1932-0205.1279
Available at: http://www.bepress.com/asjcl/vol5/iss1/art11
1 The 1991 Report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, A/46/609 and Corr. I, para 76.
2 For example, the barring of three opposition party leaders from participating in the 2004 general elections on grounds of criminal convictions related to their political activities: “Three opposition leaders barred from running in Malaysia elections”, AFX Asia, 4 March 2004. However, one of the accused was later not convicted: “Malaysian court quashes opposition leader’s prison sentence on state secrets charge”, Associated Press Newswires, 15 April 2004. Also, in view of the Prime Minister’s prerogative to advise the constitutional monarch to dissolve Parliament and to call for a general election, the ruling coalition can restrict the political campaigning by opposition parties by limiting the campaigning period to polling day to as short as 8 days in the 2004 general elections: “Malaysian Election Commission: Polls to be held Mar 21”, Dow Jones International News, 5 March 2004; William Case, “Malaysia’s general elections in 1999: a consolidated and high-quality semi-democracy” (2001) 25(1) Asian Studies Review 35 at 38. The Internal Security Act has also been used by the government to detain opposition party members, presumably to deny them the right to contest in the general elections: Francis Loh, “Understanding the 2004 Election Results: Looking Beyond the Pak Lah Factor” (2004) 24(3) Aliran Monthly 8 at 10. It has also been observed by commentators that the Sedition Act 1971, the 1970s amendments to the Constitution and the Elections Act prohibited opposition parties from freely campaigning on certain popular issues such as citizenship: see Diane K. Mauzy, Barisan Nasional: Coalition Government in Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur: Marican & Sons, 1983).
3 All of Malaysia’s mainstream newspapers and the broadcasting media are controlled by the government and it has been widely accepted that these mainstream mass media have been biased in their reports, favouring the ruling coalition and portraying a poor and distorted image of the opposition parties: see Abdul Rashid Moten, “August 2004 By-election in Terengganu, Malaysia:
The Ascendance of Islam Hadhari” (2006) 34(1) Asian Profile 43 at 50; Mustafa K. Anuar, “The
Role of Malaysia’s Mainstream Press in the 1999 General Election” in Francis K.W. Loh & Johan
Saravanamuttu eds., New Politics in Malaysia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2003) 53-65; Tun Mohd. Suffian Hashim et al, The Election Watch Report: the 1990 General Elections (Kuala Lumpur: Election Watch, 1990) 12-4; Mustafa K. Anuar, “The Media Circus Comes to Town” (2004) 24(2) Aliran Monthly 19.
4 Eleven states in Peninsular Malaysia and the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak.
5 See online:
6 Singapore later separated with the Federation in 1965.
7 Lim Hong Hai, “Electoral Politics in Malaysia: ‘Managing’ Elections in a Plural Society” in A.
Croissant et al ed., Electoral Politics in Southeast and East Asia (Singapore: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2002) 101.
8 The Senate (Dewan Negara) and the House of Representatives (Dewan Rakyat).
9 See Mavis Puthucheary, “Contextualising Malaysian Elections” in M. Puthucheary & N. Othman eds., Elections and Democracy in Malaysia (Bangi, Selangor: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2005) 2-8.
10 The Barisan Nasional (BN) comprising mainly the United Malays National Organisation (Umno), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC).
11 Despite the recent setback in the 2008 elections where the ruling coalition lost power in five states in Peninsular Malaysia.
12 Such as the Barisan Alternatif (BA).
13 See Lim Hong Hai, supra note 7 at 102.
14 Ibid.
15 See Mavis Puthucheary, supra note 9 at 3.
16 Lim Hong Hai, supra note 7 at 102.
17 The basic electoral rules were formulated prior to independence, 1957, for the first federal election in the Federation of Malaya in 1955. These basic electoral rules, together with important additions and changes, were then incorporated into the Federal Constitution adopted at the independence. Important amendments were also made to the election laws both before and after the 1963 formation of the expanded Federation of Malaysia.
18 For a brief exposition of the various election offences, see “Elections Offences” (2004) 24(2)
Aliran Monthly 29.
19 Lim Hong Hai, supra note 7 at 103.
20 See Tunku Sofiah Jewa, Malaysian Election Laws vols. 1-3 (Kuala Lumpur: Pacifica Publications, 2003) 15, 71, 353, 490, 573, 877, 1090, 1267, 1509 and 1871.
21 See ibid. See also Khoo Boo Teik, “Limits to Democracy: Political economy, ideology and ruling coalition” in M. Puthucheary & N. Othman eds., Elections and Democracy in Malaysia (Bangi, Selangor: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2005) 42 which usefully details the relevant figures pertaining to BN’s electoral victory reproduced here in the following manner [year] (percentage of seats won: percentage of votes collected): 1959 (71%: 51.7%), 1964 (86%: 58.5%), 1969 (64%: 49.3%), 1974 (88%: 60.7%), 1978 (84%: 57.2%), 1982 (86%: 60.5%), 1986 (84%: 55.8%), 1990 (71%: 53.4%), 1995 (84%: 65.2%), 1999 (77%: 56.5%).
22 See online: <http://www.spr.gov.my/index/history.htm>.
23 Lim Hong Hai, “Making the system work” in M. Puthucheary & N. Othman eds., Elections and Democracy in Malaysia (Bangi, Selangor: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2005) 249.
24 Khoo Boo Teik, supra note 21 at 40.
25 See generally Goh Ban Lee, “The Demise of Local Government Elections and Urban Politics” in M. Puthucheary & N. Othman eds., Elections and Democracy in Malaysia (Bangi, Selangor: Penerbit Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia, 2005) 49.
26 Ibid at 56.
27 Ibid at 62.
28 Ibid.
29 The general powers and duties of the Election Commission are spelled out under Section 5 of
Elections Act 1958.
30 Comprising a chairman and two other members.
31 Article 114(1) today states: “The Election Commission shall be appointed by the Yang di-Pertuan Agong after consultation with the Conference of Rulers, and shall consist of a chairman, a deputy chairman and three other members.”
32 Ibid.
33 Article 115(2) of the Federal Constitution; Section 3 of Elections Act 1958.
34 Comprising a chairman, deputy chairman, and five other members.
35 See online: <http://www.spr.gov.my/index/organization.htm>.
36 Article 114(3) of the Federal Constitution.
37 Article 125 of the Federal Constitution.
38 Article 114(5) of the Federal Constitution.
39 However, the independence and impartiality of the Election Commission has been severely doubted in view of its implementation and operation. For example, the 2004 general elections saw a mere 8 days of campaigning despite constitutional provisions stipulating that elections may be held within 60 days after the dissolution of Parliament: see “The Election Commission is Not Free and Fair” (2004) 24(2) Aliran Monthly 30.
40 Article 114(2) of the Federal Constitution.
41 For instance, members of the MCA and the MIC, both of which belong to the Alliance led by the dominant ruling party Umno.
42 See Lim Hong Hai, supra note 7 at 114.
43 Ibid.
44 Constitution (Amendment) Act of 1960.
45 Article 114(6) of the Federal Constitution.
46 Constitution (Amendment) Act of 1962 (No. 14 of 1962), cl. 21, inserting Article 114(5A).
47 It was observed, however, that subsequent replacements of members were not found to be “flagrantly partisan”: Lim Hong Hai, supra note 7 at 114. It could be surmised that the government is well aware of the controversy that it would attract had it done otherwise, and therefore retreated into a more subtle co-optation exercise in recent decades.
48 Article 114(3) of the Federal Constitution.
49 Tan Sri Abdul Rashid Abdul Rahman. See “Move to let polls panel members stay till 66”, New Straits Times (Malaysia), 21 November 2007.
50 See “KL approves Bill extending term of election chief”, The Straits Times (Singapore), 12
December 2007; “Protest march to Parliament foiled; 29 activists detained”, The Straits Times
(Singapore), 12 December 2007.
51 Such dominance far exceeds the requirement of a two-thirds majority for constitutional amendment.
52 “Abdullah warns: Public safety before freedom”, The Straits Times (Singapore), 11 December
2007. See also “Protest march to Parliament foiled; 29 activists detained”, The Straits Times (Singapore), 12 December 2007.
53 Tunku Sofiah Jewa, Malaysian Election Laws vol. 1 (Kuala Lumpur: Pacifica Publications, 2003) 5.
54 Lim Hong Hai, supra note 23 at 252.
55 No. 14 of 1962.
56 See Constitution (Amendment) Act 1962 (No. 14 of 1962), cl. 31.
57 See also Thirteenth Schedule, clauses 9-11 of the Federal Constitution today.
58 Act A206.
59 The legislature now had the final say on the number of parliamentary constituencies and their apportionment among the states. An example would be the Constitution (Amendment) (No. 2) Act 1984 (Act A585), cl.14 which amended the number of members for the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Labuan under Article 46 of the Constitution.
60 Lim Hong Hai, supra note 23 at 253.
61 Thirteenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution.
62 Ibid.
63 Act A585.
64 See Article 113(2)(i).
65 Article 113(3A)(i) reads: “Where the number of elected members of the House of Representatives is altered in consequence of any amendment to Article 46, or the number of elected members of the Legislative Assembly of a State is altered in consequence of a law enacted by the Legislature of a State, the Election Commission shall undertake a review of the division into federal or State constituencies, as the case may be, of the area which is affected by the alteration, and such review shall be completed within a period of not more than two years from the date of the coming into force of the law making the alteration.”
66 See ibid.
67 See for example, Election Watch, Report on the eighth Malaysian general elections held on 20th and 21st October 1990 (Kuala Lumpur: Election Watch, 1990) 10.
* Tey edits the Asian Journal of Comparative Law and directs the Centre for Commercial Studies at the National University of Singapore
