The fate of Thailand’s fiercely contested democracy raises the spectre of rising authoritarianism in Southeast Asia. If Thai democracy fails and ends up under a draconian regime akin to its chequered past of military-authoritarian rule, an arc of authoritarianism would grip mainland Southeast Asia in view of Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. Such a potential authoritarian resurgence bears geopolitical implications in line with China’s interests at the expense of the preferences among liberal democratic major and middle powers such as the United States, Japan, Australia, and beyond.

To be sure, even while it flourished, Thai democracy was hardly of a liberal democratic variety. The trajectory of Thailand’s democratic development was congenitally topsy-turvy, underpinned by 18 successful or attempted military coups and as many constitutions over 78 years. Contemporary periods of liberal democratic openings transpired in the mid-1970s, bookended by a student uprising against a military dictatorship in October 1973, and a consequent right-wing backlash three years later. More recently, much of the decade after the May 1992 Bangkok middle class-led protest that brought down disguised military-authoritarian rule was marked by a liberal democratic interval where the military was at bay and fundamental rights and freedoms thrived. Civil society activism and a post-1992 consensus gave rise to the much-heralded “people’s charter??? in the 1997 constitution.

But the liberal orientation of Thailand’s consolidating democratic order was soon eroded by the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra and his phenomenal Thai Rak Thai party. As his political power became entrenched and unstoppable, Thaksin’s authoritarian abuses in tandem with his electoral successes became the stuff of legend, and formed the basis of the September 2006 coup that deposed him. Thai democracy at the height of the Thaksin years was of the “illiberal??? variety, deprived of the rule of law, checks-and-balance, separation of powers, independent judiciary, civil society vibrancy, and space for dissent. While his rule abused the liberal intentions of the 1997 charter, it did observe and stay within the confines of the democratic game that prevailed at the time.

Since the coup, Thai democracy may have shed not just its liberal pretensions but also its democratic aspirations.

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This article appeared Aug 15, 2010 in Opinion Asia.